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Aൻඌඍඋൺർඍ
 We examine the impact of descentralized public policy in the form of inter-
governmental fi scal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of 
reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local ex-
ecutive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of 
various types of intergovernmental fi scal transfers. We fi nd that the odds of 
reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for 
both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretion-
ary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher 
odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in 
the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner up in the 
previous election. Finally we fi nd evidence that the amount of discretionary 
transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in 
those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are 
robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables.
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Rൾඌඎආൾඇ
Analizamos el impacto de la política pública descentralizada bajo la forma de 
transferencias fi scales inter-gubernamentales sobre los resultados electora-
les a nivel local. Usando una base de datos especialmente compilada para 
este trabajo, examinamos el impacto de diferentes tipos de transferencias 
inter-gubernamentales sobre la probabilidad de reelección. Encontramos 
que la probabilidad de reelección de los incumbentes es creciente en las 
dummies de incumbencia para los dos principales partidos. Los gobiernos 
locales que reciben un monto positivo de transferencias discrecionales 
desde el gobierno provincial también poseen mayores probilidades de ser 
reelegidos. La probabilidad de reelección también es creciente en relación 
a la diferencia en el porcentaje de votos entre el primero y el segundo en 
la eleccion previa. Finalmente, encontramos evidencia de que el monto de 
transferencias discrecionales per capita afecta positivamente la probabilidad 
de reelección sólo en aquellos gobiernos locales alineados políticamente 
con el gobierno provincial. Nuestros resultados son robustos a la inclusión 
de variables de control adicionales. 
Palabras Clave: Reelección, Transferencias Inter-Gubernamentales, Política 
Fiscal, Gobiernos Locales.
Código JEL: H72, C23, C25. 
I. Bൺർ඄඀උඈඎඇൽ ൺඇൽ ආඈඍංඏൺඍංඈඇ
In many federal countries, a large proportion of local governments 
rely almost exclusively on revenues other than their own. This may be due 
to the fact that many local governments have expenditure levels which are 
far larger than the amount of taxes collected locally. It may also be the result 
of the specifi c features of the inter-jurisdictional fi nancial arrangements in 
place. Either way, this form of fi nancing local spending may generate an 
incentive structure that discourages local fi scal discipline and may have 
adverse effects on electoral competition. In this paper, we focus on the po-
litical (electoral) effects of inter-governmental cash transfers for a sample 
of over 2000 local elections in Argentina. Our study makes two related con-
tributions. Firstly, it introduces electoral competition as a predictor of the 
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probability of reelection. Secondly, it assesses the impact of different types 
of transfers –automatic, discretionary- on the probability of reelection.
There is a vast literature addressing the relationship between cash 
transfers and economic and political outcomes [Levitt (1995),Khemani 
(2003), Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), Litschig and Morrison (2009), 
Brollo et al. (2009), Arvate et al. (2010) Brollo and Nannicini (2011)]. Levitt 
(1995) shows that higher federal transfers to a constituency increases the 
congressional incumbent’s vote share by a signifi cant margin. Using data 
for Brazilian municipalities, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) show that 
higher public expenditures increase the probability of reelection of Brazilian 
mayors; more specifi cally, higher capital expenditures in the years preceding 
the election and higher current expenditures in the election year increase the 
probability of reelection. There are several studies exploring various aspects 
of the relationship between fi scal transfers and electoral results for Argen-
tine municipalities. Porto and Porto (1999) suggest that fi scal performance 
during the election year and the previous year is a signifi cant predictor of the 
probability of reelection of local mayors in the Buenos Aires province. Sim-
ilarly, Porto and Porto (2000) fi nd that capital expenditures are associated 
with a greater probability of reelection. More recently, a paper by Cingolani 
et al. (2009) fi nds that municipalities and townships which receive discre-
tionary transfers in the election year increase their probability of reelection; 
another paper by Paniagua (2012) fi nd that provincial transfers are distrib-
uted politically to municipal governments in her study of two Argentine 
provinces, Buenos Aires and Córdoba. Although the scholarly literature has 
found reelection rates of local mayors and governors (and legislators) to be 
rather high [Porto and Porto (1999), Porto and Porto (2000), Sakurai and 
Menezes-Filho (2008), Levitt (1995)], there are various differing explanations 
as to the variables that infl uence the probability of reelection.
The choice of local governments of the province of Cordoba is made 
on the basis of its signifi cance as a politically decentralized constituency –the 
province with the largest number of local governments- and the availability 
of disaggregated transfer and electoral data. The period examined also al-
lows us to explore whether aligned and swing districts have been targeted by 
the provincial government –which remains the same political color through-
out the period- by the selective allocation of discretionary funds.
The theoretical presumption behind our hypothesis is that the vote 
share of the incumbent party at the local level is directly related with the 
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amount of money spent in the local jurisdiction. More precisely, in line with a 
long-standing literature, we argue that the vote share going to the incumbent 
party is a function of spending fi nanced with resources that are collected 
without local political effort; in other words, the larger the share of spend-
ing which is fi nanced through resources not locally collected –resources 
collected in other jurisdictions, automatic and discretionary transfers from 
the provincial and national government, resources collected from local tax-
es designed to be applied to non-local taxpayers1-, the larger the vote share 
for the incumbent party. Note that due to several data limitations obtaining 
vote shares, we use a proxy that has been widely used in the literature: the 
probability of reelection.
II. Lඈർൺඅ ඀ඈඏൾඋඇආൾඇඍඌ ංඇ Aඋ඀ൾඇඍංඇൺ
As of 2010, there are 2259 recognized local governments in Argenti-
na, half of which have the legal status of municipality.2 Local governments 
elect their own representatives and receive transfers from both the provincial 
and national governments. In most provinces, a population of at least 10000 
is required for a municipality to have the right of sanctioning their own mu-
nicipal charter. Smaller local governments are not entitled to this. In many 
aspects, Argentine municipalities are afforded a great deal of autonomy by 
law. Due to the tax-sharing system, however, in practice municipalities are 
heavily dependent on both automatic and discretionary transfers from above. 
This is the case for the large majority of Argentine local governments where 
own-source municipal revenues amount to less than half ot total revenues; in 
many cases, own-source revenues are less than 10% of total revenues. On av-
1.   There are several types of such resources applied in local governments such as the Tasa de Abas-
to, whose aim is to tax products entering the jurisdicton from other jurisdictions and has been 
levied by local governments in the Buenos aires province, the Tasas de publicidad y propaganda, 
which is levied on advertising in local trades especially in the provinces of Mendoza and Cór-
doba, and Contribuciones sobre ventas de extraña jurisdicción, which is particularly important 
in the province of Cordoba where most of the mid-size and large municipalities have gradually 
imposed taxes on sales which are carried out locally by non-resident fi rms.
2. Each province has its own municipal regime which, among other things, specify the population 
criteria for being considered a municipality and provisions regarding their autonomy. The pop-
ulation requirements are usually higher in larger provinces –criteria range from 2000 to 10000 
for Santa Fe, Córdoba and Salta- than in smaller provinces –criteria range from 500 to 1000 for 
Catamarca, Corrientes, Chaco, La Pampa, Neuquén and Santa Cruz. Several provinces defi ne dif-
ferent types of municipalities according with population size; this often entails different fi scal and 
political autonomy regimes. The legal status for units not meeting the population requirement for 
a municipality varies between provinces –Comisión de Fomento, Comuna, Comisión Municipal, 
Delegación Municipal, Comisión Rural– although most of them face similar restrictions on their 
fi scal and political autonomy.
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erage for municipalities in over half of the Argentine provinces, only around 3 
out of 10 pesos –the local currency- are collected locally.3
Municipal governments in Argentina are heterogenous in several as-
pects. They differ in total population –three municipalities with over a mil-
lion inhabitants while several municipalities in Chaco, Corrientes and other 
provinces have less than 1000 inhabitants-, economic status –from rich and 
resourceful agricultural and industrial districts with large tax bases to deso-
late and impoverished municipalities with little own-source revenues-, and 
the extent of their capacity and autonomy –municipalities providing a wide 
range of public services to municipalities providing only the most basic set 
of services. Figure 1 shows the average local government population and the 
total number of local governments by province. The fi ve largest provinces 
–Buenos Aires (BUE), Mendoza (MZA), Córdoba (CBA), Santa Fe (SFE), 
and Entre Ríos (ERI) have very different distributions of local governments. 
While the fi rst two have the largest average population by local government, 
local governments in the latter are amongst the least populated districts on 
average. For all the other provinces, however, a clear pattern emerges: there 
seems to be a negative association between total number of local govern-
ments and average local population size.
II.1  The province of Cordoba: an ideal testing ground 
The province of Cordoba boasts the largest number of local govern-
ments and is also among the provinces with the smallest average district size 
(7955 inhabitants). The average locality in the province of Córdoba has a 
population 12 to 14 times smaller than the average locality in the provinces 
of Buenos Aires and Mendoza.4 According to its Ley Orgánica de Municipios 
which rules on all important organizational and fi scal municipal matters, 
local governments are of two types: municipalities (“municipio”), with a 
population larger than 2000, and townships (“comuna”), with a population 
below 2000.5 This distinction between municipalities and townships is im-
portant since the tax-sharing scheme between the Province of Cordoba and 
the local governments has different provisions for both types of governments.
The fi nancial arrangements between the province of Cordoba and its local 
governments are laid out in the Ley 8663 - Régimen de Coparticipacion de 
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3.  This includes the sale of public assets and capital resources which are highly volatile. 
4.  This ratio is even smaller if we exclude the capital cities in each of the provinces.
5.  All municipalities with a population larger than 10000 are considered cities (“ciudades”) and are 
granted the right to sanction their own Carta Orgánica which is the equivalent to the local Constitution.
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Impuestos entre la Provincia y sus Municipalidades y Comunas. According 
to this tax-sharing law, the total amount of transfers that the provincial gov-
ernment distributes to the lower level –known as primary distribution- is 
made up of 20% of the provincial sales tax, 20% of the housing tax and 20% 
of the amount that the province itself receives from the National government 
as transfers from the national tax-sharing fund. This total is split between 
local governments to form the secondary distribution in the following manner: 
80.5% goes automatically to municipal governments; 3% goes automatically 
to local townships and other local communities; 12% goes to local govern-
ments which run their own public health services through the Fondo para 
el Financiamiento de la Descentralización; 1.5% are selectively assigned 
to struggling governments –these are usually known as Aportes del Tesoro 
Provincial–; and 3% goes to pay for general and infrastructure investment in 
selected municipalities and townships through the Programa de Asistencia 
Municipal. The latter are, in practice, highly discretionary.6
For a large majority of local governments in the province of Cór-
doba, public spending is fi nanced by transfers from the provincial level.7 
6.  It is relevant to note that more than 83% of this fund is allocated automatically to local govern-
ments depending on population and government type –devolution and population criteria–; while 
only around 4.5% and 16.5% are subject to more political discretion in their allocation –redistri-
butive and political criteria.
7.  They also receive non-automatic transfers from the Federal level. 
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Figure 1: 
Number of local governments and average population by district size
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Local tax bases are virtually non-existent in most local governments below 
2000 inhabitants and represent only a small fraction of total revenues in 
municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants. However, municipalities 
with populations above 10000 inhabitants –only around 10% of total local 
governments- often collect local taxes and other revenues to meet their ex-
penditures. On the other hand, local debt levels have been falling markedly 
relative to transfers throughout the period under examination. As Table 1 
shows, the average ratio of total debt relative to total transfers went from 
0.90 in 2001 to less than 0.20 in 2010.8 Larger municipalities tend to have 
debt-to-transfers ratios above 1 while smaller municipalities and townships 
show ratios below 1.9
Although we do not have data on the structure of local government 
revenues, the available information suggests that in 80% –328 out of 427- of 
the local jurisdictions the level of public spending is by and large fi nanced by 
transfers from above.10 Although these jurisdictions represent only around 13% 
of the population of the province, they are electorally relevant on two fronts: 
they contribute votes to both the executive –proportional representation elect-
ed in a unique district- and legislative provincial election –mixed-member 
district with around two-thirds of the Legislature elected through proportional 
representation in a unique district (Province) and around one-third elected 
in single-member district plurality voting (where districts are lower level 
provincial administrative divisions known as Departments).11
8. This only includes municipalities as we could not obtain the total debt for townships and villages 
for 2010.
9. Due to the limited availability of data on public debt holdings, we are only able to get a rather 
sketchy picture of the importance of public debt as a source of local government fi nancing. Howe-
ver, since total transfers are largely automatic and follow a population and devolution criteria it 
is clear that public debts have either fallen or grown at a much slower rate than total transfers. 
During this period, the evidence shows, transfers appear to have been by and large the main 
source of local government fi nancing.
10. If debt is a signifi cant local government resource then it may be the case that this had an impact 
on the probability of reelection. Unless local governments were able to issue as much public debt 
as they wanted at a negligible cost, a higher public debt position implies a lower spending levels 
for a given tax rate and/or higher tax rates to maintain a given spending level –both diminish 
theoretically the probability of reelection through a higher cost of raising local taxes and/or lowe-
ring local public spending. In the empirical analysis below, we include the public debt position to 
control for this possibility.
11. It is interesting to note that since each Department elects a legislator for the provincial legislative 
assembly, population size is hardly a good indicator of political relevance. In other words, small 
municipalities and townships often play a critical role in regional politics due to their alignment 
with the provincial government and/or due to strategic political reasons. In fact, a relevant pro-
portion of provincial legislators in recent decades have previously held offi ce as mayors in small 
local governments. 
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III. Dൺඍൺ ൺඇൽ ආൾඍඁඈൽඈඅඈ඀ඒ
Data on transfers come from the annual release of the Cuenta de In-
versión Ejercicio Financiero by the Ministry of Finance of the province of 
Cordoba.12 We group transfers into automatic and discretionary.
III.1  Automatic transfers: COPA and FOFINDES
The Co-Participación a Municipios (COPA) is by and large the most 
important transfer that local governments receive. It is non-earmarked and is 
distributed according with both a devolutive –population- and redistributive –
minimum provision- criteria. Signifi cantly smaller, the Fondo para el Financi-
amiento de la Descentralización (FOFINDES) is also non-earmarked although 
it compensates those local governments running their own health services. 13
III.2  Discretionary transfers: ATP, ATN, and PAM
These transfers are neither automatic nor allocated on the basis of 
any devolutive or redistributive criteria. Two of these are given out at the 
will of the Provincial government –Fondo para Emergencias y Desequi-
12. We have adjusted all the fi nancial data for infl ation using the regional GDP defl actor. We also 
adjust for government size by using constant-prices transfers per capita in all cases.
13. The provision of basic and low-level healthcare services were transferred (continued on next page) 
(continued from previous page) to municipalities and townships by National law starting 1989. 
Between 1989 and 1995, local governments initially were paying for non-personnel costs and 
capital expenditures. After the provincial economy went into a deep economic crisis in 1995, both 
personnel and other running costs were transferred to the local governments which eventually 
caused an increase in debt levels of local governments. See Cingolani (2001) for more details.
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Local government population
 Year Total less 2000
2000-
5000
5000-
10000
10000-
25000
25000-
50000
over 
50000
2001 0.90 0.64 0.85 1.09 1.70 1.15 1.52
# govs 249 106 62 47 22 7 5
2010 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.36 1.09
# govs 254 93 62 52 33 9 5
Note: Since we only have complete debt data for municipalities –the debt information for townships and 
villages is missing for 2010– for both years, we include only municipalities for the calculations above.
Table 1: Local government debt relative to total transfers
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14. The only available information on regional economic activity is the series on departamental 
GDP estimations produced by the province of Cordoba that we use as a control variable in the 
econometric section.
librios Económicos (ATP) and Programa de Asistencia Municipal (PAM). 
The third fund –Aportes del Tesoro Nacional (ATN)- consists of discretionary 
transfers from the National government.
Figure 2: 
GDP and total transfers to municipalities and townships 
of the province of Córdoba, 1999-2011 (in millions of constant 1993 pesos)
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There are no offi cial accounts or estimates for local economic activity.14 
However, since decentralized automatic transfers are highly correlated with 
the evolution of provincial economic activity, they can be used as a fi rst-
hand proxy of local economic activity. Therefore, we use the automatic 
transfer variables to capture at least part of the effect of local (regional) eco-
nomic conditions on the probability of reelection. Contrarily, discretionary 
transfers (ATN, ATP, PAM) are better suited to capture political infl uence 
on the probability of reelection. Figure 3 presents the evolution of both 
types transfers for the period 1999-2011. On the left panel, we can see that 
both automatic transfers closely match the evolution of provincial GDP per 
capita. The right panel shows that discretionary transfers –ATN, ATP and 
PAM- are only loosely associated with the evolution of provincial economic 
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activity and are prone to sharp variations from one year to another. National 
transfers tend to be rather unimportant after 2003 but provincial transfers 
have grown in size in recent years. More importantly, some of these trans-
fers seem to increase sharply in election years.
Figure 3: Average transfers per capita by type, 1999-2011
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local elections concurring with the provincial election, we gathered data 
from both selected local jurisdictions and from secondary sources –regional 
and local newspapers and radio stations.15 We obtained three types of data 
on elections characteristics and outcomes. Firstly, we recorded information 
on both winning parties and mayors to construct incumbency dummies and 
re-election dummies.16 Secondly, we collected data on vote shares for each 
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15. Obtaining data directly from the local electoral councils is often diffi cult due to poor record kee-
ping thereby we resorted to many secondary sources. We are aware that errors and inacuracies 
may be present in our data.
16. We end up with a balanced panel with 427 cross-sectional units and 5 time periods, 2135 ob-
servations in total.
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of the major parties in each election year and data on margin of victory.17 
Finally, we also recorded election dates to create dummies and “distance” 
variables between local and provincial/national dates.
III.4  Data modelling and estimation
Table 2 summarizes the electoral data. The reelection rate of parties 
and mayors stands at around 76% and 61% respectively for all years. May-
ors have lower reelection rates due to a number of different reasons such as 
primary elections, deaths, resignations and removals. The reelection rate is 
increasing throughout the period going from 73.07% and 54.57% respec-
tively in the 1999 election to 78.45% and 69.55% respectively in the 2011 
election. Also, the reelection rates for municipalities are slightly lower than 
for townships, specially if we look at reelection of mayors.
Our estimation approach follows a two-step procedure. Firstly, we 
test whether the probability of reelection is affected by the amount and type 
of transfers that local mayors receive. We use a logistic regression approach. 
The main independent variable is the amount of per-capita transfers from 
the national and provincial government to the local governments. We also 
include additional controls such as dummies for incumbent parties. Our 
baseline specifi cation is:
REELECi,t = β0 + β1 TRFi,t + β2 PJINCPREi,t + β3 UCRINCPREi,t+εi,t     (1)
where REELECi,t is a dummy recording whether the incumbent party 
was re-elected (1) or not (0) in the locality i for the election year t; TRFi,t 
is a variable that captures per capita transfers to locality i in the election 
year t; PJINCPREi,t  and UCRINCPREi,t are party incumbency dummies for 
locality i and period t for PJ and UCR parties. 
We run the regressions for both reelection of parties and mayors using 
a logistic regression with pooled observations. We do not use a fi xed-effects 
17. The two major nationwide parties in Argentina are the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Unión 
Cívica Radical (UCR). Both have widespread presence at sub-national levels: in fact, only 12% 
of the total number of elections have been won by parties other than the UCR and PJ. We also 
recorded vote shares obtained by three other parties: the Partido Nuevo, later renamed Frente Cí-
vico formed in 2003; a local grassroots party known as the Unión Vecinal and the Frente para la 
Victoria, the ruling party at the National level. The reason we include the latter is that the PJ at the 
national level is fragmented in two blocks: the Frente para la Victoria and the Peronismo Federal.
124 Fඋൾංඅඅൾ, Cൺඉൾඅඅඈ
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LII | N° 1| (2014) | ඉඉ. 113-135 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
All four elections
Parties Mayors
 Group Reelect Change Total RR Reelect Change Total RR
Full sample 1295 413 1708 75.82 1044 664 1708 61.12
Municipalities 759 246 1005 75.52 596 409 1005 59.30
Townships 536 167 703 76.24 448 255 703 63.72
1999 Election
Parties Mayors
 Group Reelect Change Total RR Reelect Change Total RR
Full sample 312 115 427 73.07 233 194 427 54.57
Municipalities 182 67 249 73.10 132 117 249 53.01
Townships 130 48 178 73.03 101 77 178 56.74
2003 Election
Parties Mayors
 Group Reelect Change Total RR Reelect Change Total RR
Full sample 316 111 427 74.00 238 189 427 55.74
Municipalities 185 64 249 74.30 136 113 249 54.62
Townships 131 47 178 73.60 102 76 178 57.30
2007 Election
Parties Mayors
 Group Reelect Change Total RR Reelect Change Total RR
Full sample 332 95 427 77.75 276 151 427 64.64
Municipalities 196 53 249 78.71 156 93 249 62.65
Townships 136 42 178 76.40 120 58 178 67.42
2011 Election
Parties Mayors
 Group Reelect Change Total RR Reelect Change Total RR
Full sample 335 92 427 78.45 297 130 427 69.55
Municipalities 196 62 258 75.97 172 86 258 66.67
Townships 139 30 169 82.25 125 44 169 73.96
The column RR in each block denotes the reelection rate for each category. It is calculated as the number 
of reelections as a fraction of the total number of elections. There are 249 municipalities and 178 towns-
hips during 1999 and 2007; and 258 municipalities and 169 townships during 2007 and 2011. Source: 
Own elaboration based on data from the Justicia Electoral and other sources.
Table 2: 
Re-election of parties and mayors
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logistic regression due to the incidental parameter problem, which may be 
really important in our case due to the small T and relatively large N, thus 
increasing the the number of nuisance parameters (Abrevaya, 1997).18 In 
such cases, there are three alternative approaches: the traditional random 
effects (RE) logit model, the conditional fi xed-effects logit and the Mund-
lak-Chamberlain approach. The fi rst two approaches require to some extent 
that the individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables 
–an assumption that is not valid for our data-; while the third approach does 
not require independence between explanatory variables and individual ef-
fects, it does require explicit functional forms. Since there is little advantage 
to the random effect model as compared to a pooled model, we decided to 
run pooled logit models.
Table 3 shows models for reelection of parties. We include two var-
iables for automatic transfers –copapc and fofi ndespc; copapc is our main 
proxy local economic activity. It comes out as not signifi cant in any of the 
models. The same applies to fofi ndespc. Incumbency dummies –pjincpre 
and ucrincpre- are both statistically signifi cant and with the expected sign: 
incumbency gives an advantage to parties since it is possitively associat-
ed with the probability of reelection for the main two parties. The models 
represent a reasonably good fi t of the data given the log-likelihood ratio 
statistic and the residual deviance. The last column reports odds ratios for 
the last model: localities where the incumbent party is the PJ and UCR are 
3.16 and 1.94 times more likely to gain reelection  respectively compared to 
incumbents from other parties. Interestingly, the pjincpre variable doubles 
also as a dummy for political alignment with the governor: since the Partido 
Justicialista (PJ) was the incumbent party at the provincial level from 1999 
to 2011, all local governments ruled by the PJ are considered party-aligned 
with the provincial level.
The amount of discretionary transfers have little (if any) effect on the 
probability of reelection: although the coeffi cients for atppc, atnpc, and pam-
pc are all positive, they are not statistically signifi cant. However, including a 
dummy for a locality receiving (1) or not-receiving (0) each type of discretion-
ary transfer in the election year changes the results somewhat. The coeffi cients 
associated with atpd and atnd –transfers from the provincial and national gov-
ernment respectively- are not statistically signifi cant; however, the coeffi cient 
18. Additionally, the nature of our data means that the main independent variables change little over 
time so most of the variation is explained by the between-unit variation. In these cases, the stan-
dard errors of the fi xed-effects coeffi cients are often too large.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (Odds)
reelecp reelecp reelecp reelecp reeelcp reelecp reelecp Model 7
copapc -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.99
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
fofi ndespc 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pjincpre 1.424*** 1.391*** 1.409*** 1.430*** 1.411*** 1.394*** 1.279*** 3.16
(0.181) (0.182) (0.185) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.186)
ucrincpre 0.736*** 0.732*** 0.730*** 0.746*** 0.721*** 0.751*** 0.743*** 1.94
(0.175) (0.175) (0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.176)
atppc 0.004*
(0.002)
atpd 0.052
(0.120)
atnpc 0.001
(0.002)
atnd 0.194
(0.149)
pampc 0.003
(0.002)
pamd 0.469*** 1.60
(0.132)
Constant 0.167 0.162 0.145 0.156 0.139 0.153 0.049
(0.164) (0.165) (0.171) (0.164) (0.165) (0.163) (0.168)
Observations 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708
Log 
Likelihood -914.613 -912.417 -914.517 -913.895 -913.744 -913.519 -908.180
Akaike Inf. 
Crit.
1.839.225 1.836.835 1.841.035 1.839.789 1.839.487 1.839.038 1.828.361
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All transfer variables are measured 
in per capita terms. Transfer variables ending in “d” are transfer dummies. Odds-ratios above 1 imply a 
positive effect on the reelection probability
Table 3: 
Reelection of parties, pooled logistic regression, 1999-2011
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19. The pam or Programa de Asistencia a Municipios (PAM) was created in 2002 and it was specifi -
cally oriented to assisting municipalities and townships meet extraordinary expenditures arising 
due to fast population growth, the need for basic public infrastructure and the improvement of 
basic public services. Although these funds are meant to complement the automatic transfers, 
the provincial executive has signifi cant power over the allocation of these funds since they are 
non-reimbursable. Cingolani et al. (2005) argue that these transfers are loosely regulated thereby 
leaving ample room for using political criteria in their allocation. The authors cite anecdotal 
evidence on several scandals concerning the arbitrary distribution of these transfers in 2005.
20. It is quite common at the local level to have candidates switching from grassroot parties to 
one of the major parties, usually the Unión Civica Radical (UCR), and also candidates swit-
ching between the two major parties. Additionally, the Partido Justicialista (PJ) has a history of 
factionalism, the most recent version separating the Kirchner’s fl avour of Peronismo from the 
Peronismo disidente –or Peronismo federal.
21. As was noted above, we have limited information on the vote shares variable. For this reason, 
we will not compare the same models but with different dependent variables –i.e. reelection/non 
reelection vs margin of victory.
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for pamd –discretionary transfers belonging to the Programa de Asistencia a 
Municipios (PAM)- is positive and highly statistically signifi cant.19
Table 4 shows the regression results for the reelection of mayors. 
The results are somewhat different to those for the reelection of parties, par-
ticularly with respect to the party incumbency dummies. Neither pjincpre or 
ucrincpre are statistically signifi cant as predictors of the probability of ree-
lecting the mayor. Although this may be against the incumbency advantage 
theory, we think it may be due to the large number of cases where party and 
mayor reelection do not coincide –there are over 300 instances where party 
gets reelected while mayor does not and nearly 70 instances where mayor 
gets reelected but running for a different party.20 The automatic transfer var-
iables are not statistically signifi cant but some of the discretionary transfers 
are. This is the case of pampc –amount of per capita transfers– and pamd 
–dummy for receiving a trasnfer or not in the election year.
The coeffi cient is statistically signifi cant in both cases and the 
odds-ratios are shown in the last column. This evidence supports the results 
from Table 3 regarding the positive association between discretionary PAM 
funds and the probability of reelection. In particular, the evidence up to this 
point would seem to suggest that the probability of reelection is related to 
whether a local government receives or not the PAM transfer. However, 
although the amount of (discretionary) transfers per capita do not affect the 
probability of reelection, it may have an effect on the margin of victory.21
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (Odds)
reelecm reelecm reelecm reelecm reelecm reelecm reelecm Model 7
copapc 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 1.000
(0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
fofi ndespc 0.0009 0.0005  0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 0.0012 1.001
(0.0008) (0.0008)  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
pjincpre 0.2384 0.1987  0.1786 0.2330 0.2303 0.1762 0.0986 1.104
(0.1735) (0.1744)  0.1762) (0.1737) (0.1738) (0.1751) (0.1780)
ucrincpre -0.1093 -0.1155  -0.1342 -0.1166 -0.1180 -0.0905 -0.1097 0.896
(0.1736) (0.1739)  0.1743) (0.1740) (0.1739) (0.1738) (0.1743)
atp 0.0038**  
(0.0016)  
atpd  0.2107
 0.1044)
atn  -0.0002
 (0.0003)
atnd  0.1036
 (0.1250)
pam  0.0053***
 (0.0020)
pamd  0.4178*** 1.518
 (0.1111)
Observations 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708 1708
Log 
Likelihood -1134.56 -1.131.148 -1.132.627 -1.134.387 -1.134.314 -1.130.276 -1.127.526
Akaike 
Inf. Crit. 2.275.600 2.271.000 2.273.900 2.277.100 2.276.600 2.267.900 2.263.000
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All transfer variables are me-
asured in per capita terms. Transfer variables ending in “d” are transfer dummies. Odds-ratios above 
1 imply a positive effect on the reelection probability
Table 4: 
Reelection of mayors, pooled logistic regression, 1999-2011.
Table 5 presents the results of including additional control variables 
to the baseline model. The fi rst three models –models (1), (2 and (3)- are for 
the reelection of parties while the last three models are for the reelection of 
mayors. Models (1) and (4) include the degree of electoral competition in 
the jurisdiction in the previous election –diff1222 . This means we lose one 
 22. This variable measures the difference in vote shares for the winner and the runner up.
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Table 5:
Reelection of parties and mayors, additional controls, 1999-2011
reelecp reelecm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
copapc -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
fofi ndespc 0.0017 0.0016 0.0023 0.0013 0.0015 0.0017
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015)
pjincpre 1.3642*** 1.3632*** 1.3633*** 0.2557 0.2342 0.2350
(0.2940) (0.2945) (0.2947) (0.2761) (0.2770) (0.2771)
ucrincpre 0.8309*** 0.8342*** 0.8245*** 0.0683 0.0474 0.0432
(0.2964) (0.2969) (0.2974) (0.2832) (0.2841) (0.2845)
pamd 0.5571*** 0.5777*** 0.5559*** 0.4554*** 0.5090*** 0.4998***
(0.1799) (0.1927) (0.1944) (0.1538) (0.1662) (0.1681)
diff12 5.4304*** 5.4572*** 5.4913*** 4.3374*** 4.2262*** 4.2439***
(0.7074) (0.7116) (0.7121) (0.5277) (0.5309) (0.5332)
year2003 -0.1331 -0.0976 -0.1672 -0.1546
(0.3330) (0.3324) (0.2987) (0.2979)
year2007 -0.0615 -0.0210 0.0863 0.1017
(0.3045) (0.3086) (0.2758) (0.2791)
year2011 -0.1444 -0.1209 0.2790 0.2886
(0.2979) (0.2997) (0.2715) (0.2729)
muni 0.1677 0.0652
(0.2119) (0.1816)
Constant -1.0560*** -0.9692** -1.1191*** -0.8663*** -0.9151** -0.9743**
(0.3108) (0.3851) (0.4308) (0.2876) (0.3574) (0.3941)
Observations 916 916 916 916 916 916
Log Likelihood -4.450.267 -4.448.560 -4.445.399 -5.685.093 -5.658.685 -5.658.039
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9.040.534 9.097.119 9.110.798 1,151.0190 1,151.7370 1,153.6080
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All transfer variables are mea-
sured in per capita terms. Transfer variables ending in “d” are transfer dummies. Odds-ratios above 1 
imply a positive effect on the reelection probability
election period, hence the reduction in the number of observations. 23 This 
variable is highly signifi cant in both regressions –parties and mayors- and 
has the expected sign: lower electoral competition is positively associated 
with the probability of reelection. Incumbency dummies are only signif-
icant for the reelection of parties echoing the previous results. However, 
23. Additionally, there is a signifi cant drop in the number of observations since our data on vote 
shares is incomplete.
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the dummy for discretionary transfers –pamd- is still positive and highly 
signifi cant.24 Models (2) and (5) include year dummies with the year 1999 
as benchmark; the results suggests that localities in the 2007 election are 
around two times more likely to gain reelection than in 2003 –there is no 
such signifi cant effect for the 2011 election. Finally, models (3) and (6) in-
clude a dummy for the size of municipal government –we assign a 1 to larg-
er, municipal governments; a 0 to smaller, townships. The results show that 
municipalities are no more likely to gain reelection of parties. Interestingly, 
the variables capturing the incumbency advantage –pjincpre, ucrincpre-, the 
resource advantage –pamd- and the degree of electoral competition in the 
district –diff12- preserve their sign and signifi cance throughout most of the 
models.
Table 6 shows regressions for the reelection of parties including 
controls for the concurrence of local with provincial and national elections. 
We have alternative measures for these variables: provelecalign and nate-
lecalign are dummies recording whether the local election is held on the 
same day as the provincial and national election, respectively. Similarly, 
daystoprovelec_va and daystonacelec_va measure the numer of days (in 
absolute value) between the local and provincial and national elections data. 
These variables are often used to give a sense of “distance” between execu-
tive elections at different levels of government. These variables are almost 
never signifi cant in any of these models. It does not seem that having local 
elections concur with provincial/national elections bear any effect on the 
probability of reelection of parties.
Thus far, we have ruled out posible interactions between the explan-
atory variables. If there are reasons to expect that the level of transfers –or, 
the decision to grant a transfer- may be dependent on the partisan alignment 
or the degree of political competition in a given district, then we must in-
clude these potentially relevant interactions. We are interested in one key 
interaction, the relationship between discretionary transfers and the political 
alignment of the local mayor. The results of these models are given in Table 
7. All the models are run using the full sample except for the last two mod-
els which run the regressions for sub-samples. The incumbency dummies 
remain strongly signifi cant as in the previous tables. The variable pampc 
–the amount of discretionary transfers per capita– does not seem to affect 
24. There appears to be a relatively high correlation between positive PAM funds and the magnitude 
of electoral competition in the districts, measured as the difference in vote shares between the 
winner and the runner up.
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reelecp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
copapc -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
fofi ndespc 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
pjincpre 1.399*** 1.302*** 1.323*** 1.334***
(0.313) (0.308) (0.309) (0.309)
ucrincpre 0.751** 0.821*** 0.808*** 0.796**
(0.312) (0.311) (0.310) (0.311)
pamd 0.616*** 0.519*** 0.577*** 0.511*** 0.785*** 0.771** 0.767*** 0.756***
(0.191) (0.183) (0.191) (0.183) (0.237) (0.332) (0.257) (0.246)
diff 12 5.802*** 5.647*** 5.743*** 5.679*** 5.989*** 6.535*** 6.152*** 6.159***
(0.741) (0.739) (0.739) (0.737) (1.106) (1.244) (1.129) (1.126)
provelecalign -0.371*
(0.207)
natelecalign -0.208
(0.470)
daystoprovelec_va 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
daystonacelec_va 0.002 -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant -0.943*** -1.043*** -1.155*** -1.194*** 0.053 -0.431 -0.083 0.480
(0.331) (0.326) (0.340) (0.350) (0.264) (0.272) (0.299) (0.331)
Observations 864 864 864 864 552 293 515 515
Log Likelihood -423.442 -424.977 -424.505 -424.443 -232.978 -57.881 -223.764 -221.582
Akaike Inf. Crit. 862.884 865.953 865.011 864.886 475.956 325.763 459.528 455.164
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All transfer variables are measu-
red in per capita terms. Transfer variables ending in “d” are transfer dummies.
Table 6: 
Reelection of parties, additional controls, 1999-2011
the probability of reelection. None of the interacted terms are statistically 
signifi cant. The last two models test the effect of the amount of discretionary 
transfers per capita on the probability of reelection. Model (5) includes only 
districts where the incumbent party is the PJ, while model (6) only includes 
observations where the incumbent party is the UCR. One interesting result 
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comparing these two models is that the coeffi cient of pampc is positive and 
statistically signifi cant for the PJ-incumbent sample while is not statisti-
cally different from zero for the UCR-incumbent sample. This suggest that 
the larger the discretionary transfers per capita to districts aligned with the 
provincial government, the larger the effect on the probability of reelection.
reelecp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
copapc -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
fofi ndespc 0.0012 0.0008 0.0010 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016)
pjincpre 1.1829*** 1.2681*** 1.1888*** 1.1257***
(0.1927) (0.1821) (0.1939) (0.3111)
pampc 0.0033 0.0027 0.0032 0.0099** -0.0045
(0.0062) (0.0024) (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0032)
muni:pampc 0.0024
(0.0062)
pamd 0.1824
(0.5620)
ucrincpre 0.6994*** 0.6779*** 0.7033*** 0.5613**
(0.1805) (0.1746) (0.1811) (0.2573)
pjincpre:pampc 0.0060 0.0060
(0.0074) (0.0074)
pampc:ucrincpre -0.0069 -0.0068
(0.0070) (0.0070)
muni -0.0809 -0.0378
(0.1442) (0.1392)
pjincpre:pamd 0.5875
(0.6581)
pamd:ucrincpre -0.1265
(0.6777)
Constant 0.2457 0.2998* 0.2672 0.3119 1.4998*** 0.8205***
(0.1681) (0.1791) (0.1856) (0.2336) (0.1250) (0.1288)
Observations 1,708 1,708 1,708 703 819 709
Log Likelihood -9.102.319 -9.137.200 -9.101.949 -3.640.465 -3.693.903 -4.169.797
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,836.4640 1,843.4400 1,838.3900 7.440.929 7.467.806 8.419.595
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All transfer variables 
are measured in per capita terms. Transfer variables ending in “d” are transfer dummies.
Table 7: 
Probability of reelection: Models with interactions
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IV. Cඈඇർඅඎൽංඇ඀ උൾආൺඋ඄ඌ
In this paper, we have studied the impact of decentralized public poli-
cy in the form of intergovernmental transfers on the probability of reelection 
of local governments in the province of Córdoba for the period 1995-2011. 
Our regressions show that there are two sources of variation in the probabil-
ity of reelection of local mayors. Firstly, there is what is often called as the 
incumbency advantage or incumbency effect. This effect is strong and it may 
be due to a number of factors which we were unable to measure (number and 
quality of challengers; incumbent advertising and publicity; etc). Secondly, 
there is what we call a “resource effect”. This effect is somewhat smaller 
but still signifi cant throughout most of our models and involves increasing 
the odds of being reelected for those local governments which receive a 
positive amount of the main type of discretionary transfer that the provincial 
government distributes among local governments. Furthermore, we fi nd that 
the higher the amount of transfers per capita –pampc- the higher the odds of 
being reelected for those local governments which are aligned with the ruling 
party at the provincial level. This relationship is not present when we consider 
the subsample of local governments not aligned with the party.
V. Rൾൿൾඋൾඇർൾඌ
Abrevaya, J. (1997). “The equivalence of two estimators of the fi xed-effects logit 
model”. Economics Letters, 55 (1), 41–43.
Arvate, P.R., Mendes, M. and Rocha, A. (2010). “Are voters fi scal conservatives? 
Evidence from Brazilian municipal elections”. Estudos Econômicos (São 
Paulo), 40 (1), 67–101.
Brollo, F. and Nannicini, T. (2011). “Tying Your Enemy S Hands in Close Races: The 
Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 5698.
Brollo, F.; Nannicini, T.; Perotti, R. and Tabellini, G. (2009). “Federal Transfers, Cor-
ruption, and Political Selection: Evidence from Brazil,” Technical Report, 
Mimeo, Bocconi University.
Cingolani, M.; Mazzalay, V. and Nazareno, M. (2005). “Gasto público y estrategias 
de distribución. La asignación de recursos provinciales entre jurisdicciones 
locales. Córdoba, 2001-2004,” Technical Report, Prepared for the 7mo Con-
greso Nacional de Ciencia Política.
Cingolani, M.; Mazzalay, V. and Nazareno M. (2009). “Gobiernos locales, redes y distri-
bución del gasto provincial en Argentina. El caso de Córdoba,” Technical Report, 
Prepared for the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association.
134 Fඋൾංඅඅൾ, Cൺඉൾඅඅඈ
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LII | N° 1| (2014) | ඉඉ. 113-135 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
Cingolani, M. (2001). “La cooperación intermunicipal después de la descentral-
ización en la Provincia de Córdoba: oportunidades y restricciones”. Cooper-
ación intermunicipal en Argentina.
Khemani, S. (2003). “Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India”. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3016.
Levitt, S.D. (1995). “The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes”.
Litschig, S. and Morrison, K. (2009). “Electoral Effects of Fiscal Transfers: Quasi-Ex-
perimental Evidence from Local Executive Elections in Brazil, 1982–1988”. 
Technical Report, mimeo, Cornell University.
Paniagua, M.V. (2012). “El Partido Justicialista y la asignación estratégica de re-
cursos: Un estudio comparado del nivel subnacional en Argentina”. Revista 
SAAP, 6 (1), 0–0.
Porto, A. and Porto, N. (1999). “Desempeño fi scal y resultados electorales,” Tech-
nical Report, Mimeo, La Plata, Universidad Nacional de La Plata-Departa-
mento de Economía.
Porto, A. and Porto, N. (2000). “Infl uencia de las condiciones económicas y fi scales 
sobre los resultados electorales provinciales y municipales”.  Documento de 
Trabajo del Departamento de Economía Nro, 26.
Sakurai, S.N. and Menezes-Filho, N.A. (2008). “Fiscal policy and reelection in Bra-
zilian municipalities”. Public Choice, 137 (1), 301–314.
135Eඅൾർඍඈඋൺඅ ൾൿൿൾർඍඌ ඈൿ ංඇඍൾඋ඀ඈඏൾඋඇආൾඇඍൺඅ ൿංඌർൺඅ ඍඋൺඇඌൿൾඋඌ...
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LII | N° 1| (2014) | ඉඉ. 113-135 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
VI. Aඉඉൾඇൽංඑ
 
Table 8: Summary statistics for the main variables
Variable Description Min Max mean n
muni Dummy for municipal status 0.0 1.0 0.6 5551
pop Total population 0.0 1322467.0 7090.7 5551
idm Index of local development 13.0 77.9 49.8 249
copapc Automatic transfers due to the 
Co-participación
25888.0 559689381.0 1708108.0 5551
fofi ndespc Transfers to fi nance health decentra-
lization
0.0 45083704.0 235502.7 5551
atnpc Non-automatic transfers from the 
National government
0.0 14733000.0 17297.0 5495
atppc Non-automatic transfers from the 
provincial government
0.0 950000.0 30250.8 5548
pampc Non-automatic transfers for extra- 
ordinary situations
0.0 1280000.0 31994.2 3845
ffspc Fondo federal solidario 0.0 1192027000.0 1203978.1 1263
fcomppc Fondo compensador 0.0 29365551.0 38231.9 1093
ucrvts Total votes obtained by the UCR 10.0 126263.0 1085.3 536
pjvts Total votes obtained by the PJ 6.0 73347.0 1002.9 676
vecvts Total votes obtained by localist parties 14.0 100356.0 1447.9 141
fcivvts Total votes obtained by the Frente 
Cívico
5.0 264442.0 1855.0 198
othvts Total votes obtained by other parties 0.0 227149.0 2125.8 159
totvts Total valid votes 25.0 623562.0 4000.6 700
winsh Vote share of the winner party 0.2 1.0 0.5 700
runsh Vote share of the runner-up party 0.1 0.9 0.3 670
thirdsh Vote share of the third party 0.0 0.4 0.1 401
diff12 Vote share difference between win-
ner and runner-up
0.0 0.9 0.2 670
diff23 Vote share difference between 
runner-up and third
0.0 0.5 0.2 401
reelecp Dummy for reelected incument party 0.0 1.0 0.7 583
ucrincpre Dummy for incumbent party UCR 0.0 1.0 0.3 3855
pjincpre Dummy for incumbent party PJ 0.0 1.0 0.6 3855
othincpre Dummy for incumbent party Other 0.0 1.0 0.1 3854
